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Abstract
This paper examines the relation between diversity and long-term economic performance
in a dynamic general equilibrium model where consumers di¤er ex ante in time preference
and labour productivity. We show that changing the distribution of these characteristics will
a¤ect the steady state by distorting the composition of aggregate labour supply. The exact
nature of this e¤ect depends on the shape of the individual labour supply function. Changing
the distribution of time preference will also a¤ect the distribution of marginal tax rates across
individuals. The aggregate outcome of this is determined by the concavity or convexity of the
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1 Introduction
Is a more heterogeneous population benecial or harmful to long-term economic performance?
What role does redistributive policy, such as progressive taxation, plays in this matter? In this
paper, we address these questions in a dynamic general equilibrium model where consumers di¤er
ex ante in time preference and labour productivity.1 Our analysis focuses on how diversity in these
consumer characteristics will a¤ect long-run economic outcomes.
The economic implications of diversity have long been a subject of empirical research.2 Several
recent studies have provided evidence on the positive e¤ect of ethnic and cultural diversity on
productivity and economic growth (e.g., Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Ager and Brückner, 2013; Trax
et al., 2015; Alesina et al., 2016).3 In contrast, there have been very few theoretical research on
this timely and important issue. This lack is somewhat surprising, given the widespread use of
heterogeneous-agent models in macroeconomics. The present study provides the rst attempt to
apply this kind of model to analyse the economic e¤ects of diversity. More specically, we adopt
a similar deterministic framework as in Sarte (1997), Li and Sarte (2004), Carroll and Young
(2009, 2011) and Angyridis (2015). In this type of model, ex ante heterogeneity is the root of
income and wealth inequality.4 Progressive taxation comes into play by distorting prices and
incentives, which in turn inuences how ex ante heterogeneity translates into ex post economic
inequality. The present study adds to this line of research in two ways: First, we examine how
changes in the distribution of consumer characteristics will a¤ect the steady state of the model
economy. In particular, our model takes into account heterogeneity in both time preference and
labour productivity, and their e¤ects are considered separately.5 This type of analysis has not been
previously undertaken. Second, unlike most of the existing studies, we do not conne ourselves to
specic parameterised form of the fundamentals (i.e., utility function, production technology and
progressive tax schedule). Instead, most of our results (except those in Section 4.3) are obtained
1We are agnostic about the origin of these di¤erences, which can be due to racial, cultural, physiological or other
reasons. Throughout this paper, we will treat the terms diversityand ex ante heterogeneityas synonymous.
2For extensive survey of this literature, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Alesina et al. (2016).
3The analysis in Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Ager and Brückner (2013) and Trax et al. (2015) are based on
micro-level data from developed countries, such as Germany and the United States. Alesina et al. (2016), on the
other hand, conduct cross-country comparisons using aggregate level data from 195 countries. Other cross-country
studies, such as Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier and Gunning (1999), focus on African countries and nd a
negative relation between ethnic diversity and economic growth.
4The implicit assumption is that there is perfect consumption insurance so that individuals choices are not
a¤ected by idiosyncratic risks. Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Huggett et al. (2011) argue that predetermined
di¤erences in consumer characteristics are more important than idiosyncratic risks in explaining the dispersion in
lifetime wealth and lifetime utility.
5Time preference heterogeneity has been previously considered in Sarte (1997), Li and Sarte (2001), Carroll and
Young (2011), Suen (2014) and Angyridis (2015) among others. The empirical evidence on this type of heterogeneity
is reviewed in Frederick et al. (2002).
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based on some generic properties of these fundamentals.
Our main ndings can be summarised as follows: In terms of labour productivity heterogeneity,
the e¤ects of greater diversity are rather straightforward. When prices are held constant, changing
the distribution of labour productivity will only a¤ect the composition of aggregate labour supply.
Individualschoices, including their labour supply decisions, are a¤ected only indirectly through the
general equilibrium e¤ect on wage rate and interest rate. Within this model, we are able to derive
a necessary and su¢ cient condition under which an increase in labour productivity heterogeneity
will lead to an expansion in aggregate labour supply in the steady state. In such a scenario, greater
diversity will benet the consumers by raising their income and consumption.
The e¤ects of time preference heterogeneity, by contrast, are more intricate due to the presence
of two often conicting forces. First, changing the distribution of time preference will a¤ect
aggregate economic outcomes by distorting the distribution of marginal tax rates across individuals.
In the context of representative-agent models, the negative relation between marginal tax rate and
capital accumulation is well understood: a decrease in marginal tax rate raises the return of savings
which in turn promotes capital accumulation.6 One novelty of the present study is to show that
in a heterogeneous-agent economy, changing the composition of the underlying population can
inuence the e¤ective marginal tax rate, even when there is no change in the tax schedule per se.
Interestingly, the outcome of this mechanism is determined by the concavity and convexity of the
marginal tax function, which is an often overlooked feature of the tax schedule.7 If the marginal
tax function is concave, then a more heterogeneous population will have a lower average marginal
tax rate and a higher level of capital accumulation. The opposite is true when it is convex. The
intuition of this can be seen by considering the following example: Start with a homogeneous
economy in which all consumers are ex ante identical, receive the same amount of before-tax
income and face the same progressive tax schedule. Suppose now a mean-preserving dispersion in
consumer characteristics is introduced. Such dispersion will lead to a non-degenerate distribution
in before-tax income and marginal tax rate. In particular, the relatively poor consumers in the
6Empirical evidence on this is scant, however, mainly because of the di¢ culty in measuring marginal tax rate.
For this reason, many studies focus on the relation between average tax rate and economic growth. One exception is
Padovano and Galli (2001) which construct country-wide point estimates of e¤ective marginal tax rate for 23 OECD
countries over the period 1951-1990 and show that this measure is negatively correlated with economic growth.
The question of how the distribution or dispersion of marginal tax rates would a¤ect aggregate economic outcomes,
however, remains unexplored.
7 If a tax function  () is thrice di¤erentiable, then the corresponding marginal tax function is concave (or convex)
if and only if the third-order derivative  000 () is negative (or positive). It is important to note that almost all the
existing quantitative studies on progressive taxation have adopted a specication which implies a concave marginal
tax function (see Section 4.1 for details). But the relation between this and the distribution of marginal tax rates
has not been fully explained until now.
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heterogeneous economy will pay a lower marginal tax rate than in the homogeneous world, and the
relatively rich will pay a higher rate. The shape of the marginal tax function matters when it comes
to aggregation. If the marginal tax function is concave, then the decrease in marginal tax rate
among the poor will outweigh the increase among the rich. As a result, the heterogeneous economy
will have a lower average marginal tax rate than the homogeneous economy.8 Our main results
in Section 4.1 generalise this comparison to any two heterogeneous economies which are otherwise
identical except for the distribution of time preference. Second, changing this distribution will also
a¤ect the formation of aggregate labour supply, as in the case of labour productivity heterogeneity.
When there is no income e¤ect on labour supply, the relation between time preference heterogeneity
and aggregate labour depends crucially on the curvature of the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labour. It remains a challenge to verify whether this type of results will
hold when the income e¤ect is operational. In Section 4.3, we provide some numerical examples
that can o¤er some insights on this issue.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the baseline model. Section 3
presents the results regarding an increase in labour productivity heterogeneity. Section 4 analyses
the e¤ects of greater time preference heterogeneity. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Consumers
Time is discrete and denoted by t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g : The economy under study is inhabited by a con-
tinuum of innitely-lived consumers with di¤erent rate of time preference and labour productivity.
The size of population is constant over time and normalised to one. Let i > 0 be the rate of time
preference of the ith consumer, i 2 [0; 1] ; and "i > 0 his labour productivity. Both are predeter-
mined and constant over time. These characteristics are cross-sectionally distributed according to
the function H (; ") ; which is dened over the support

; 
 ["; "] with  >  > 0 and " > " > 0:
This distribution can be either discrete or continuous (or mixed). The marginal distribution of
time preference and labour productivity are denoted by H1 () and H2 (") ; respectively.
In each time period, each consumer is endowed with one unit of time which can be divided
between work and leisure. Let ni;t and li;t denote, respectively, the fraction of time spent on work
8The e¤ects under a convex marginal tax function are similar but in opposite directions.
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and leisure by the ith consumer at time t: These variables are subject to the following constraints:
ni;t 2 [0; 1] ; li;t 2 [0; 1] ; and ni;t + li;t = 1: (1)
There is a single commodity in this economy which can be used for consumption and investment.
Let ci;t be the consumption of the ith consumer at time t: All consumers have preferences over
sequences of consumption and labour hours which can be represented by
1X
t=0
tiU (ci;t; ni;t) ; (2)
where i  (1 + i) 1 is the subjective discount factor of the ith consumer and U () is the (per-
period) utility function. The latter is identical for all consumers and has the following properties.
Assumption A1 The utility function U : R+  [0; 1] ! R is twice continuously di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing in c, strictly decreasing in n and jointly strictly concave in (c; n) : It also satises
the conditions: lim
c!0
Uc (c; n) =1 for all n 2 [0; 1] and lim
n!0
Un (c; n) = 0 for all c  0:
Assumption A2 The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour, denoted
by 	 (c; n)   Un (c; n) =Uc (c; n) ; is non-decreasing in c and strictly increasing in n:
Assumption A2 implies that both consumption and leisure are normal goods.9 This assumption
can be equivalently stated as
Ucn (c; n)  Un (c; n)
Uc (c; n)
Ucc (c; n) and Unn (c; n)  Un (c; n)
Uc (c; n)
Ucn (c; n) ;
for all (c; n) : Assumptions A1 and A2 are satised by most of the commonly used utility func-
tions in quantitative studies. Two examples are the class of additively separable utility func-
tions, i.e., U (c; n) = u (c)   v (n) ; and the so-called no-income-e¤ect utility function, i.e.,
U (c; n)  u (c  v (n)) :10 In both cases, u () is strictly increasing and strictly concave, while
v () is strictly increasing and strictly convex. For the no-income-e¤ectutility, the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and labour is given by 	 (c; n) = v0 (n), which is independent
of c:
9This means, holding other things constant, an increase in non-wage income in the current period will lead to an
increase in current consumption and a decrease in current labour supply. This normality assumption is commonly
used in existing studies. See for instance, Nourry (2001) and Datta et al. (2002).
10The latter is also often referred to as GHH preferences, named after the study by Greenwood et al. (1988).
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Next, we turn to the budget constraint for an individual consumer. Let wt be the wage rate for
an e¤ective unit of labour at time t: Then consumer is labour income at time t is given by wt"ini;t:
Consumers can save and borrow through a single risk-free asset. Let ai;t denote consumer is asset
holdings at the beginning of time t: The consumer is in debt if this variable takes a negative value.
The interest income (or interest payment) associated with these assets is rtai;t; where rt is the
interest rate. The sum of labour income and interest income, denoted by yi;t  wt"ini;t + rtai;t; is
subject to a progressive tax schedule.11 This is represented by a function  () which satises the
following properties.
Assumption A3 The tax function  : R+ ! R+ is continuously di¤erentiable and strictly
increasing with  (0)  0: The marginal tax rate is zero at the origin, i.e.,  0 (0) = 0; strictly
increasing for all y  0 and satises lim
y!1
0 (y) =   1:
The assumption of an increasing marginal tax rate is often referred to as marginal rate pro-
gressivity. This, together with  (0)  0; is equivalent to average rate progressivity, i.e., average
tax rate  (y) =y is increasing in y: A negative value of  (0) can be interpreted as a xed lump-sum
transfer from the government. In this case,  (y) is the net tax payment for a consumer with
taxable income y:
Consumer is budget constraint at time t is then given by
ci;t + ai;t+1   ai;t = yi;t    (yi;t) : (3)
Taking prices and tax schedule as given, each consumers problem is to choose a sequence of
consumption, leisure, labour and asset holdings so as to maximise his lifetime utility in (2), subject
to the time-use constraints in (1), the sequential budget constraint in (3) and the initial amount of
assets a0 > 0.12 There is no other restriction on borrowing except the no-Ponzi-scheme condition,
which is implied by the transversality condition stated below. The solution of the consumers
problem is completely characterised by the sequential budget constraint in (3); the Euler equation
11This setup, which is commonly used in the existing studies, implicitly assumes that interests paid on loans are
tax deductible. This assumption is adopted mainly for analytical convenience. In most countries, interests paid on
personal loans are in general not deductible from taxes. In the United States, for instance, taxpayers can claim
deductions on interests paid on student loans and residential mortgages but not on other types of loans (such as
credit card debts).
12The current framework can be easily extended to allow for heterogeneity in initial wealth. But since we focus
on steady-state analysis, this type of heterogeneity is irrelevant for our results.
6
for consumption
Uc (ci;t; ni;t) = iUc (ci;t+1; ni;t+1)

1 +

1   0 (yi;t+1)

rt+1
	
; (4)
the optimality condition for labour supply
	 (ci;t; ni;t)   Un (ci;t; ni;t)
Uc (ci;t; ni;t)
 wt"i

1   0 (yi;t)

; (5)
which holds with equality if ni;t 2 (0; 1); and the transversality condition
lim
T!1
8<:
"
TY
t=1
 
1 + 'i;t
# 1
ai;T+1
9=; = 0;
where 'i;t  [1   0 (yi;t)] rt is the after-tax return from asset holdings. The condition in (5) takes
into account the possibility that a consumer may choose to have zero leisure hours in certain
time period, i.e., ni;t = 1 for some t:13 This happens when the relative price of leisure, i.e.,
wt"i [1   0 (yi;t)] ; is greater than or equal to the marginal rate of substitution at ni;t = 1; i.e.,
	 (ci;t; 1) :
2.2 Production and Government
On the supply side of the economy, there is a large number of identical rms. In each period, each
rm hires labour and rents physical capital from the competitive factor markets, and produces
output using a neoclassical production function: Yt = F (Kt; Nt) ; where Yt denotes output at time
t; Kt and Nt denote capital input and labour input, respectively. The properties of the production
function are summarised below.
Assumption A4 The production function F : R2+ ! R+ is twice continuously di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly concave in (K;N) : It also exhibits constant returns to scale (CRTS)
in the two inputs and satises the Inada conditions.
Since the production function exhibits CRTS in its inputs, we can focus on the prot-maximisation
problem of a single representative rm. Let Rt be the rental price of physical capital at time t.
13The other corner solution ni;t = 0 can be ruled out by the condition lim
n!0
Un (c; n) = 0; for all c  0; stated in
Assumption A1.
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Then the representative rms problem is
max
Kt;Nt
fF (Kt; Nt)  wtNt  RtKtg ;
and the rst-order conditions are Rt = FK (kt; 1) and wt = FN (kt; 1) ; where kt  Kt=Nt is the
capital-labour ratio at time t:
Tax revenues collected by the government are entirely spent on unproductive government
purchases (Gt) : This spending is called unproductive because it has no direct e¤ect on consumers
utility and rmsproduction. The governments budget constraint in every period t is given by
Z 1
0
 (yi;t) di = Gt; for all t  0: (6)
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium
Given a progressive tax schedule, a competitive equilibrium consists of sequences of allocations
fci;t; li;t; ni;t; ai;tg1t=0 for each i 2 [0; 1] ; aggregate inputs fKt; Ntg1t=0 ; prices fwt; rt; Rtg1t=0 and
government spending fGtg1t=0 such that
(i) Given prices and the tax function, fci;t; li;t; ni;t; ai;tg1t=0 solves consumer is problem.
(ii) Given prices, fKt; Ntg1t=0 solves the representative rms problem in every period.
(iii) The governments budget is balanced in every period.
(iv) All markets clear in every period, so that
Kt =
Z 1
0
ai;tdi; and Nt =
Z 1
0
"ini;tdi; for all t  0:
We conne our attention to the stationary equilibria or steady states of this economy, which
can be characterised as follows: For any non-trivial steady state with capital-labour ratio k > 0;
let w (k) and r (k) be the corresponding wage rate and interest rate. To highlight the dependence
of individual choices on (; ") ; we use y (k; ; ") ; c (k; ; ") ; a (k; ; ") and n (k; ; ") to denote,
respectively, the level of before-tax income, consumption, asset holdings and labour of a type-
(; ") consumer in this steady state (the subscript i will be omitted from this point on). These
individual-level variables are determined by
 = r (k)

1   0 [y (k; ; ")]	 ; (7)
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c (k; ; ")  y (k; ; ")   [y (k; ; ")] ; (8)
a (k; ; ") =
y (k; ; ")  w (k) "n (k; ; ")
r (k)
; (9)
1  n (k; ; ") ; 	 [c (k; ; ") ; n (k; ; ")]  w (k)
r (k)
"; (10)
[1  n (k; ; ")]

w (k)
r (k)
" 	 [c (k; ; ") ; n (k; ; ")]

= 0: (11)
Equation (7) is obtained by setting Uc (ci;t; ni;t) = Uc (ci;t+1; ni;t+1) in the Euler equation of
consumption.14 The intuition of this equation is as follows: In any stationary equilibrium, each
consumer has a tendency to perfectly smooth their marginal utility of consumption over time.
To achieve this, the after-tax return from asset holdings must be equated to the consumers rate
of time preference. This has two important implications. Firstly, consumers with the same rate
of time preference will face the same marginal tax rate and have the same level of before-tax
income, regardless of their labour productivity. In other words, y (k; ; ") is independent of ":
Secondly, for any given  in

; 

; y (k; ) is a strictly decreasing function in k: This is due to the
following mechanism: Holding other things constant, an increase in k will encourage the consumer
to substitute future consumption for current consumption by lowering the before-tax return from
asset holdings. In order to maintain a constant marginal utility of consumption, it is necessary
for the marginal tax rate to fall so that the after-tax return is again equal to : Since  0 () is
strictly increasing, this means before-tax income y (k; ) will have to fall after an increase in k: In
subsequent discussions, we will refer to this as the intertemporal smoothing e¤ect. Note that this
e¤ect arises only when the income tax schedule is nonlinear.15 Equation (8) is obtained by setting
ai;t+1 = ai;t in the sequential budget constraint. This, together with (7), implies that c (k; ; ") is
also independent of ": Equation (9) follows from the denition of before-tax income. Equations
(10) and (11) are the complementary slackness conditions for labour. In particular, the second
inequality in (10) is obtained by substituting (7) into (5).
14Note that equation (7) remains valid even if (i) we allow for ex ante heterogeneity in the utility function, i.e.,
U i (c; n) 6= U j (c; n) for some i 6= j in [0; 1] ; and (ii) there is no disutility from labour, i.e., U (c; n1) = U (c; n2) for
all n1 6= n2 in [0; 1] and for all c  0:
15 If the income tax function is linear, i.e.,  0 (y) = b for all y  0; then the steady-state value of k is uniquely
determined by (1  b) r (k) = : In this case, only those consumers with the lowest rate of time preference (i.e.,
the most patient consumers) will hold a strictly positive amount of assets. All other consumers will either have
zero wealth (if they are not allowed to borrow) or exhaust the borrowing limit (if an ad hoc borrowing constraint
is in place) as in the model of Becker (1980). Sarte (1997) shows that equation (7) plays a key role in obtaining a
nondegenerate steady-state wealth distribution in the presence of time preference heterogeneity. The implications of
the intertemporal smoothing e¤ect, however, is less mentioned in the existing literature.
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The next step is to derive a single equation that can help determine the value of k: Dene
 : [0;  ]! R+ [f+1g as the inverse of the marginal tax function, i.e.,  [ 0 (y)] = y for all y  0:
Since  0 () is continuous and strictly increasing, its inverse is a single-valued, continuous, strictly
increasing function. Using (7) and the denition of before-tax income, we can write
y (k; )  

1  
r (k)

= w (k) "n (k; ; ") + r (k) a (k; ; ") : (12)
Integrating both sides of (12) across all types of consumers yields
Y (k) 
Z 



1  
r (k)

dH1 () = [f (k)  k]N (k) ; (13)
whereH1 () is the marginal distribution of ; N (k) is the aggregate labour supply function dened
by
N (k) 
Z 

Z "
"
"n (k; ; ") dH (; ") ;
and f (k)  F (k; 1) is the reduced-form production function. Equation (13) is essentially an
accounting identity which states that the sum of all individuals income equals national income
(dened as aggregate output minus depreciation of capital). In the sequel, we will refer to Y () as
the national income function. A unique, non-trivial steady state exists if (13) has a single, strictly
positive solution. The rest of this section is devoted to establishing the existence of a unique,
non-trivial steady state.
We begin by specifying the range of plausible values of k: Since  () is only dened on [0;  ] ;
equations (12) and (13) are satised only if
1    1  
r (k)
 0;
for all  2 ;  : In other words, any k that solves (13) must satisfy

1    r (k)  : (14)
To ensure that this range is nonempty, it is necessary to impose the condition  > (1  ) : By
the strict concavity of f () and the Inada conditions on the production function, there exists a
10
Y(k)
kmax
k
kmin
Γ(k) N(k)
k*
Figure 1a
Y(k)
kmax
k
kmin
Γ(k) Ñ(k)
Γ(k) N(k)
Figure 1b
unique pair of values kmax > kmin > 0 such that
r (kmax)  f 0 (kmax)   =  and r (kmin) =

1   :
It follows that any solution of (13) must be contained within the interval [kmin; kmax] : Lemma 1
provides a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a unique steady state.
The proof of this lemma and other theoretical results can be found in the Appendix. A graphical
illustration of the unique steady state is provided in Figure 1a.16
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions A1-A4 and  > (1  )  are satised. Then a unique steady
state with capital-labour ratio k 2 (kmin; kmax) exists if and only if
N (kmax) [f (kmax)  kmax] >
Z 



1  


dH1 () ; (15)
and
N (kmin) [f (kmin)  kmin] <
Z 



1  

(1  )

dH1 () : (16)
16Conditions (15) and (16) are some technical conditions which ensure that the two curves in Figure 1a will cross
at least once within the range (kmin; kmax) : The function   () in these diagrams is dened as   (k)  f (k)   k;
which also appears in the proof of Lemma 1.
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3 Heterogeneity in Labour Productivity
In this section we examine how greater heterogeneity in labour productivity will a¤ect the steady
state of the baseline model. Our results are based on a comparison between two economies which
are otherwise identical except for the marginal distribution of ": To facilitate this comparison, we
assume that the two characteristics,  and "; are statistically independent in the population so
that H (; ") = H1 ()H2 (") for all (; ") :
Consider two economies which have the same size of population, utility function u () ; produc-
tion technology F (), progressive tax schedule  () and marginal distribution of time preference
H1 () dened over

; 

:17 The only di¤erence between them lies in the distribution of labour
productivity, which are denoted by H2 (") and eH2 (") : Both are dened over ["; "] and satisfy the
assumption below.
Assumption A5 (i) The average value of " is identical under H2 () and eH2 (). (ii) Conditions
(15) and (16) are satised in both economies.
The second part of Assumption A5 ensures that both economies have a unique steady state.
Notice that when k is held constant, changing the distribution of labour productivity will have
no e¤ect on the individual-level variables dened by (7)-(11). From (13), it is evident that the
distribution of " will a¤ect the steady-state capital-labour ratio only through the aggregate labour
supply function. Intuitively, what this means is that when prices are kept constant, changing
the distribution of " will only a¤ect the composition of aggregate labour supply. Individual-level
variables are a¤ected only indirectly through the general equilibrium e¤ect on w (k) and r (k) :
Let N () be the aggregate labour supply function dened under H2 () ; i.e.,
N (k) 
Z 

Z "
"
"n (k; ; ") dH2 (") dH1 () ;
and similarly dene eN (k) using eH2 () : From Figure 1b, it is evident that if eN (k)  N (k)
for all k 2 [kmin; kmax] ; then the economy with H2 () will have a higher steady-state capital-
labour ratio than the one with eH2 () : The opposite is true if the ordering of N () and eN () is
reversed. Proposition 3 provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition under which eN (k)  N (k)
for all k 2 [kmin; kmax]. The implications of this on other variables of interest are summarised in
Proposition 4. Before presenting these results, we rst establish a basic property of individual
17This implies that both economies have the same range of plausible values of steady-state capital-labour ratio,
[kmin; kmax] ; as dened in (14).
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labour supply function which plays a key role in the analysis.
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumptions A1-A4 and  > (1  )  are satised. Then for any k 2
[kmin; kmax] and  2

; 

; n (k; ; ") is a non-decreasing function in ": If, in addition, n (k; ; ")
is an interior solution, then it is strictly increasing in ":
The intuition of this result is clear: since more productive workers have a higher opportunity
cost of leisure, they tend to work more than less productive ones. This result holds in general
when (i) the marginal tax rate on labour income and interest income are identical, and (ii) the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour is strictly increasing in labour.
Both assumptions are satised in most of the existing studies.
Lemma 2 also has the implication that a one-percent increase in " can, in some cases, lead
to a greater percentage increase in e¤ective unit of labour, i.e., "n (k; ; ") : Specically, let "2 =
(1 + ) "1; for some  > 0; and suppose n (k; ; "1) and n (k; ; "2) are both interior solutions.
Then we have "2n (k; ; "2) > (1 + ) "1n (k; ; "1) : Thus, in the current setting an endogenous
labour supply has the e¤ect of amplifying the variations in labour productivity across consumers.
We now present the main results of this section.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions A1-A4 and  > (1  )  are satised. Then N (k)  eN (k)
for all k 2 [kmin; kmax] if and only if
Z "
x
"dH2 (") 
Z "
x
"d eH2 (") ; for all x 2 ["; "] : (17)
To explain the main ideas behind this proposition, rst rewrite N (k) and eN (k) as
N (k) 
Z "
"
"N (k; ") dH2 (") and eN (k)  Z "
"
"N (k; ") d eH2 (") ; (18)
where N (k; ") is the average labour supply across all consumers with the same level of "; i.e.,
N (k; ") 
Z 

n (k; ; ") dH1 () :
We can now interpret N (k)  eN (k) as comparing the expected value of "N (k; ") under H2 ()
and eH2 ().18 By Lemma 2, "N (k; ") is a bounded, continuous, starshaped function in " and (17)
18 If "N (k; ") is convex in " for any given k 2 [kmin; kmax] ; then N (k)  eN (k) if and only if eH2 () is more unequal
than H2 () under the Lorenz dominance criterion. The function "N (k; ") ; however, is not convex in general. The
details of this point are available from the authors upon request. This is the main reason why we opt for a stronger
stochastic ordering, namely the starshaped ordering (dened below).
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is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for ranking the expected value of this type of functions.19
In the statistics literature, this type of ordering is known as the starshaped ordering of probability
distributions. A detailed discussion of this type of ordering can be found in Shaked and Shan-
thikumar (2007, Section 4.A.6). If two distributions H2 () and eH2 () have the same mean and
satisfy (17), then eH2 () is also more unequal than H2 () under the standard Lorenz dominance
criterion [or equivalently, eH2 () is a mean-preserving spread of H2 ()]. Thus, Lorenz ordering is
implied by starshaped ordering. When applied to the current context, this means eH2 () is more
dispersed than H2 () ; and thus represents a more heterogeneous population.
Equipped with the result in Proposition 3, we can now compare the steady states under H2 ()
and eH2 () : Let k and ek be the unique solution of (13) under H2 () and eH2 () ; respectively.
In terms of aggregate variables, a more dispersed distribution of labour productivity is associated
with a lower value of capital-labour ratio but a higher value of aggregate labour and national
income. At the individual level, greater heterogeneity will benet the consumers by raising their
before-tax income and consumption. These results are summarised in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions A1-A5 and  > (1  )  are satised. Suppose eH2 () is
more heterogeneous than H2 () according to (17). Then we have
(i) k  ek; N (k)  eN ek and Y (k)  Y ek :
(ii) y (k; )  y
ek;  and c (k; )  cek;  for all  2 ;  :
These results can be explained as follows: Holding other factors (especially k) constant, an
increase in labour productivity heterogeneity will lead to an expansion in aggregate labour supply.
This lowers the capital-labour ratio which then triggers the aforementioned intertemporal smooth-
ing e¤ect. In particular, before-tax income will increase across all types of consumers, followed by
national income and individual consumption.20
4 Heterogeneity in Time Preference
We now examine the steady-state outcomes of greater time preference heterogeneity. Following
the same approach as in Section 3, we compare two economies which are otherwise identical except
19Recall that a real-valued function  () dened on [0;1) is called starshaped if  (0)  0 and  (x) =x is nonde-
creasing.
20The e¤ects on aggregate capital K  kN (k) and aggregate output N (k) f (k) ; however, are ambiguous, due to
the opposing e¤ects on k and N (k) :
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for the marginal distribution of : Throughout this analysis, we will maintain the assumption that
 and " are statistically independent across the population.
Comparing to the previous section, the task we face here is more complicated due to the
following reasons: Firstly, since national income is formed by summing individuals before-tax
income y (k; ) over the distribution of ; changing this distribution will have a direct e¤ect on the
function Y () : This e¤ect is not present in the case of labour productivity heterogeneity as y (k; )
is independent of ". Secondly, it is now more di¢ cult to characterise the shape of n (k; ; ") in 
due to the presence of an income e¤ect on labour supply. More specically, changes in  will a¤ect
individual labour supply in two ways: (i) by changing the after-tax wage rate through the variable
y (k; ) ; and (ii) by distorting the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour
through the variable c (k; ) : The latter is what we refer to as the income e¤ect.
Because of these added complexities, the theoretical analysis in this section is based on two
simplied versions of the baseline model. First, in Section 4.1 we assume that individual labour
supply is an exogenous constant. As a result, aggregate labour input is independent of the dis-
tribution of  and other parts of the economy. This abstraction allows us to focus on the e¤ects
of time preference heterogeneity on Y (k) alone. As we will see below, these e¤ects are entirely
determined by the shape of the marginal tax function  0 (). This part of the analysis thus high-
lights the role of the progressive tax schedule in determining the impact of greater time preference
heterogeneity. Next, in Section 4.2 we reintroduce a exible labour supply but abstract away from
the aforementioned income e¤ect. This is achieved by adopting the so-called no-income-e¤ect
preferences. In this case, the e¤ects of greater time preference heterogeneity are jointly determined
by the shape of the marginal tax function and that of the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labour. Finally, in Section 4.3 we provide some simple numerical examples to
illustrate the workings of the baseline model where the income e¤ect is operational.
4.1 Exogenous Labour Model
The baseline model can be signicantly simplied once we remove the assumption of exible labour
supply. Instead of imposing Assumptions A1 and A2, we now set U (c; n)  u (c) for all c  0
and n 2 [0; 1] ; where u : R+ ! R is a twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave function that satises lim
c!0
u0 (c) =1: Individual and aggregate labour supply are
then given by ni;t = 1 for all i and Nt = b" > 0; where b" is the average labour productivity across
consumers. The rest of the economy is the same as in the baseline model.
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In any stationary equilibrium, y (k; ) and c (k; ) are again determined by (7) and (8) but the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions in (10)-(11) are now superseded by n (k; ; ") = 1; for all (k; ; ") : The
steady-state value of k is then determined by
Z 



1  
r (k)

dH1 () = [f (k)  k]b": (19)
Note that any solution of (19) depends only on the mean value of " but not any other moment.
Thus, there is no loss of generality in assuming that H2 (") is a degenerate distribution at b". Using
the same line of argument as in the proof of Lemma 1, one can show that a unique solution of (19)
exists if and only if (15) and (16) are satised [with N (kmax) and N (kmin) replaced by b"].
We now compare two economies which are otherwise identical except for the distribution of ,
which are denoted by H1 () and eH1 () : Both are dened over ;  and satisfy the assumption
below.
Assumption A6 (i) eH1 () is a mean-preserving spread of H1 () : (ii) A unique steady state
exists in both economies.
The rst part of Assumption A6 implies that eH1 () is more dispersed than H1 () ; and thus
represents a more heterogeneous population. Let Y () and eY () be the national income function
dened using H1 () and eH1 () ; respectively. Similarly, let k and ek be the unique solution of
(19) under H1 () and eH1 () : Then a more heterogeneous population is said to be benecial (or
harmful) to long-term capital accumulation if ek  k (or ek  k).21 The main results of this
subsection are summarised below.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumptions A3, A4, A6 and  > (1  )  are satised.
(i) If the marginal tax function is concave, then Y (k)  eY (k) for all k 2 (kmin; kmax) and a
more heterogeneous population is benecial to long-term capital accumulation.
(ii) If the marginal tax function is convex, then Y (k)  eY (k) for all k 2 (kmin; kmax) and a more
heterogeneous population is harmful to long-term capital accumulation.
One interesting special case is when H1 () is also a degenerate distribution, say at some point b
in

; 

: In this case, we are comparing an identical-agent (IA) economy, in which all consumers are
21Since aggregate labour is an exogenous constant, aggregate capital, aggregate output and national income are
all increasing in k. Thus, Proposition 5 is equivalent to saying that a more heterogeneous population is benecial
(or harmful) to aggregate output and national income if the marginal tax function is concave (or convex).
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identical, to a heterogeneous-agent (HA) economy, where consumers have di¤erent time preference.
Proposition 5 then implies that the HA economy will have a higher (or lower) level of long-run
capital accumulation than the IA economy if the marginal tax function is concave (or convex).
The intuition of these results can be understood by comparing the distribution of marginal tax
rates in these two economies.
In the IA economy, all consumers have the same before-tax income y (k;b) and face the same
marginal tax rate  0 [y (k;b)] : A mean-preserving spread in the rate of time preference will lead
to a dispersion in both of these variables. In particular, it will lower the marginal tax rate for
those with  greater than b and raise the marginal tax rate for the others.22 If the marginal tax
function is concave, then the average marginal tax rate will be lowered as a result. Specically, if
 0 () is concave, then we have
 0 [y (k;b)]  1
1  eH1 (x)
Z 
x
 0
h
y
ek; i d eH1 () ;
for all x 2 ;  : The expression on the right side is the average marginal tax rate faced by those
with   x in the HA economy. The lower average marginal tax rate then contributes to a higher
level of capital accumulation in the HA economy. On the contrary, if  0 () is concave, then we
have
 0 [y (k;b)]  1eH1 (x)
Z x

 0
h
y
ek; i d eH1 () ;
for all x 2 ;  : In this case, consumers in the HA economy will in general face a higher marginal
tax rate, which is detrimental to capital accumulation.
Our next proposition generalises this comparison to any two HA economies that satisfy Assump-
tion A6. For any q 2 [0; 1] ; dene  (q) as the qth quantile ofH1 () ; i.e.,  (q)  sup f : H1 ()  qg :
Similarly, dene e (q) as the qth quantile of eH1 () :
Proposition 6 Suppose Assumptions A3, A4, A6 and  > (1  )  are satised.
(i) If the marginal tax function is concave, then for any q 2 [0; 1]
Z 
(q)
 0 [y (k; )] dH1 () 
Z 
e(q)  0
h
y
ek; i d eH1 () :
22This is because y (k; ) is a strictly decreasing function in  under any given value of k: This property can be
easily shown using the rst part of (12).
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(ii) If the marginal tax function is convex, then for any q 2 [0; 1]
Z (q)

 0 [y (k; )] dH1 () 
Z e(q)

 0
h
y
 ek; i d eH1 () :
We conclude this subsection by pointing out the prevalence of concave marginal tax function in
the existing literature. Two parametric forms of  () are commonly used in quantitative studies.
The rst one is the isoelastic form adopted by Guo and Lansing (1998), Li and Sarte (2004) and
Angyridis (2015). This can be expressed as  (y) = y1+; with  > 0 and  > 0: The parameter
 is often interpreted as a measure of tax progressivity. It is straightforward to show that the
marginal tax function is concave (or convex) when   1 (or   1): Using U.S. tax returns data,
Li and Sarte (2004) estimate that the value of  was 0.88 in 1985 and 0.75 in 1991. Both imply a
strictly concave marginal tax function. Another commonly used tax function is the one proposed
and estimated by Gouveia and Strauss (1994),
 (y) = a0
h
y    y a1 + a2  1a1 i : (20)
This functional form was adopted by Sarte (1997), Conesa and Krueger (2006), Erosa and Kore-
shkova (2007), Carroll and Young (2011) among others. The second and third-order derivatives of
this function are given by
 00 (y) = a0a2 (1 + a1) (1 + a2ya1)
 

2+ 1
a1

ya1 1;
 000 (y) =
 00 (y)
y

a1   1  (2a1 + 1)

a2y
a1
1 + a2ya1

: (21)
In all existing applications, the parameters a0, a1 and a2 are taken to be strictly positive which
ensure that  00 (y) > 0: Gouveia and Strauss (1994) report estimates of a1 ranging from 0.726 to
0.938 based on U.S. data. From (21), it is obvious that these values of a1 imply  000 () < 0; i.e., a
strictly concave marginal tax function.
4.2 Endogenous Labour Without Income E¤ect
Suppose now the utility function is given by U (c; n) = u [c  v (n)] ; where u : R+ ! R and
v : [0; 1] ! R+ are both twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing. The former is
also strictly concave and satises lim
x!0
u0 (x) = 1; while the latter is strictly convex and satises
lim
n!0
v0 (n) = 0: The rest of the economy is the same as in Section 2.
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In any stationary equilibrium, equations (7)-(9) will remain valid while the optimality condition
for labour supply can be simplied to become
v0 [n (k; ; ")]  w (k)
r (k)
"; (22)
with equality holds if n (k; ; ") < 1: It is now straightforward to specify the conditions under which
n (k; ; ") is an interior solution for all types of consumers.
Lemma 7 Suppose Assumption A4 is satised. If v0 (1) > w (kmax) "; then n (k; ; ") < 1 for all
k 2 [kmin; kmax] and for all (; ") 2

; 
 ["; "] :
Let H1 () and eH1 () be two distinct distributions of  dened over ;  : As in Section 4.1, we
assume that eH1 () is a mean-preserving spread of H1 () ; and a unique steady state exists under
both distributions. When labour supply is exible, an increase in time preference heterogeneity will
not only a¤ect the national income function Y () ; but also the aggregate labour supply function
N () : The e¤ects on Y () are the same as in Proposition 5.23 The e¤ects on N () are examined
below.
Proposition 8 Suppose Assumptions A3, A4, A6,  > (1  )  and v0 (1) > w (kmax) " are
satised. Then the following results hold for any k 2 [kmin; kmax] and for any " 2 ["; "] :
(i) If v0 () is a concave function, then n (k; ; ") is convex in  and N (k)  eN (k) :
(ii) If v0 () is a convex function, then n (k; ; ") is concave in  and N (k)  eN (k) :
To understand these results, rst consider the labour supply decision of a single consumer.
Suppose the condition for interior solution is satised. Then optimality is attained when the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour, i.e., v0 (n) ; equals the after-tax wage
rate. The latter is determined by the steady-state capital-labour ratio, as well as the consumers
own characteristics. For the sake of this discussion, we will denote the after-tax wage rate simply
as $ and individual labour supply as n ($) : Since v0 (n) is increasing, individual labour supply is
increasing in $; i.e., n ($2)  n ($1) whenever $2  $1: The curvature of v0 (n) then determines
whether a high-wage earner will respond more to the same increase in $ than a low-wage earner.
Specically, if v0 (n) is concave, then a high-wage earner will have a larger response to the same
23 In particular, for any k 2 (kmin; kmax) ; Y (k) is less (or greater) than eY (k) if the marginal tax function is concave
(or convex). This result is independent of the assumptions on labour supply.
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Table 1: Main Results of Section 4.2
 0 () v0 () Y (k) k
concave concave " Ambiguous
convex convex # Ambiguous
convex concave Ambiguous #
concave convex Ambiguous "
increase in after-tax wage rate, i.e.,
n ($2 + )  n ($2)  n ($1 + )  n ($1) :
This is equivalent to saying that individual labour supply is a convex function in $: When com-
paring across consumers with di¤erent rate of time preference, rst note that the after-tax wage
rate in (22) is linearly increasing in : Thus, consumers with a higher value of  will have a higher
after-tax wage rate, and by the above reasoning, individual labour supply is a convex function in 
when v0 () is concave:24 A mean-preserving spread in  will then lead to an increase in the average
value of "n (k; ; ") across all types of consumers, hence N (k)  eN (k) for any given k:25
Based on the results in Propositions 5 and 8, we can identify four possible scenarios depending
on the shape of  0 () and v0 () : Table 1 summarises the overall e¤ects of greater time preference
heterogeneity in each of these cases. These e¤ects can be easily seen with the aid of Figure 1a,
hence the proof is omitted. For instance, when both  0 () and v0 () are concave, an increase in
time preference heterogeneity will shift both the national income function and the aggregate labour
supply function up, according to Propositions 5 and 8. This will lead to an unambiguous increase
in national income, but an ambiguous e¤ect on the capital-labour ratio. The latter is due to the
presence of two opposing forces: on one hand, an increase in time preference heterogeneity will
lower the average marginal tax rate on asset return which is benecial to capital accumulation; on
the other hand, such an increase will induce an expansion in aggregate labour supply and suppress
24 It is possible to establish a partial converse of this result. Specically, if n (k; ; ") is convex (or concave) in  over
the interval

; 

; then v0 () is concave (or convex) between n  k; ; " and n (k; ; ") [see the proof of Proposition
8 for further details]. This suggests that the condition of a concave (or convex) v0 () is rather tight.
25Studies that use the no-income-e¤ect preferences typically assume that v () has an isoelastic form, e.g.,
v (n)  An1+; with A > 0 and  > 0: The rst derivative of this function is strictly concave (or strictly convex) if
and only if  < 1 (or  > 1). A less-than-unity value of  seems to be more common in the existing literature. For
instance, Greenwood et al. (1988), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and Correia (2010) have used values ranging from
0.4 to 0.8.
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the capital-labour ratio. Which e¤ect will prevail is a quantitative question. The other three cases
in Table 1 can be interpreted in a similar way.
4.3 Numerical Examples
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we have identied two mechanisms through which greater heterogeneity in
time preference can a¤ect the macroeconomy. The rst one manifests itself by a¤ecting the cross-
sectional distribution of marginal tax rates and the national income function, while the second
one operates through the aggregate labour supply function. In this subsection, we will use some
numerical examples to illustrate the working of these forces in the full version of the baseline model.
There are two specic reasons why we resort to quantitative analysis here. First, the presence of
income e¤ect poses a serious challenge in characterising the shape of n (k; ; ") as a function in
: Without knowing this, we cannot ascertain qualitatively the e¤ect of greater time preference
heterogeneity on N () as in Proposition 8. Second, as the results in Table 1 indicate, the overall
e¤ects of greater heterogeneity in  are often ambiguous due to simultaneous changes in Y () and
N () : The use of numerical calculations can help shed some light on these issues.
Consider a parameterised version of the baseline model with the following specics: One period
in the model is a year. The consumers period utility function is given by
U (c; n) = ln c A n
1+1= 
1 + 1= 
;
where A is a positive-valued parameter and  is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. The value
of A is calibrated so that, on average, consumers spend about one-third of their time on work
in the steady state. The resulting value of A is 54.30. The Frisch elasticity of labour supply
is set to 0.40, which is consistent with the estimates obtained by MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji
(1986). The production function is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form, i.e., F (K;L) =
KL1 ; with  = 0:40: We choose the value of  so that the steady-state capital-output ratio
matches its empirical counterpart in the United States over the period 1953-2009, which is 2.427.26
This requires  = 8:74%: The progressive tax function is assumed to take the form in (20), with
a1 = 0:768 and a2 = 0:031: These values are taken from Gouveia and Strauss (1994). The
value of a0 is calibrated so that the average tax rate, dened as the ratio between total tax
revenues and total taxable income, is 14.18%. This matches the average tax rate in the United
26To calculate this value, we use the sum of private xed assets and the end-of-year stock of private inventories as
our measure of aggregate capital. Data on private xed assets and private inventories are obtained from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis website.
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States over the period 1986-2014.27 The required value of a0 is 0.323.28 Under this choice of
(a0; a1; a2) ; the implied marginal tax function is strictly concave, i.e.,  000 () < 0: In terms of
consumer characteristics, we assume that both  and " are uniformly distributed across consumers
with  = 0:0571;  = 0:0753; " = 1 and " = 100: The implied maximum and minimum value of 
are 0.946 and 0.930, respectively. Similar range of values of (; ") have also appeared in Carroll
and Young (2011).29 The benchmark parameter values are summarised in Table 2. The resulting
value of ve key variables, namely the capital-output ratio k; aggregate labour N (k) ; national
income Y (k) ; aggregate capital kN (k) and aggregate output (k)  N (k) ; are reported in
Table 3.30
The next step is to construct some alternative distributions of  with di¤erent degrees of
time preference heterogeneity. Intuitively, a mean-preserving spread of the benchmark uniform
distribution can be obtained by hollowing out the middle section and relocating the mass to
the upper and lower ends. To put this in practice, rst dene       ; 1   + =3 and
2   + 2=3: Using 1 and 2 we can partition the distribution of  into three groups of equal
mass. In the examples presented below, we focus on distributions of  with density
eh1 () =
8>>>><>>>>:
1= for  2

; 1

;
= for  2 [1; 2) ;
2= for  2 [2; ] ;
for some positive-valued parameters ; 1 and 2: The benchmark uniform distribution corresponds
to the case when  = 1 = 2 = 1: A mean-preserving spread can be obtained by lowering  and
solving (1; 2) from
Z 

eh1 () d = 1 and Z 

eh1 () d = + 
2
:
We then solve the baseline model under four alternative distributions with  2 f0; 0:5; 0:95; 1:5g ;
27Data on this measure of average tax rate are readily available from Figure A on page 31 of Statistics of Income
 2014 Individual Income Tax Returns, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C.
28The marginal tax function associated with (20) is given by  0 (y) = a0
h
1  (1 + a2ya1) (1+1=a1)
i
: As y tends to
innity, the marginal tax rate becomes a0 in the limit. Hence, we have  = a0 = 0:323:
29Unlike Carroll and Young (2011), we do not calibrate the distribution of consumer characteristics to match the
empirical distribution of income and wealth. The main purpose of the numerical examples is to demonstrate how
changes in the distribution of  will a¤ect the functions Y () and N () in the baseline model, rather than to mimic
the observed patterns of inequality. For this reason, we opt for the most parsimonious distribution, which is the
uniform distribution. One important consideration behind the choice of

; ; "; "
	
is the existence of steady state,
i.e., to ensure that the conditions in (15) and (16) are satised.
30The MATLAB codes for generating the reported results are available on the authorspersonal website.
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Table 2 Benchmark Parameter Values
A Preference parameter 54.30
 Frisch elasticity of labour supply 0.400
 Share of capital income in total output 0.400
 Depreciation rate of capital 0.0874
a0 Parameter in the progressive tax function 0.323
a1 Parameter in the progressive tax function 0.768
a2 Parameter in the progressive tax function 0.031
 Minimum value of rate of time preference 0.0571
 Maximum value of rate of time preference 0.0753
" Minimum value of labour productivity 1.0
" Maximum value of labour productivity 100.0
Table 3 Results of Numerical Examples
Benchmark % Changes from Benchmark
 = 1:0  = 0  = 0:5  = 0:95  = 1:5
k 4.384 0.27% 0.15% 0.02% -0.17%
N (k) 19.478 9.72% 4.83% 0.48% -4.74%
Y (k) 27.719 9.79% 4.86% 0.48% -4.78%
kN (k) 85.397 10.02% 4.98% 0.49% -4.90%
(k) N (k) 35.180 9.84% 4.89% 0.49% -4.80%
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while keeping all other parameters and the distribution of " unchanged. In general, a lower value
of  indicates a higher level of heterogeneity. Thus, the distribution with  = 1:50 is actually less
diverse than the benchmark uniform distribution.
Figure 2 shows the national income function Y () and the aggregate labour supply function
N () obtained under various values of , including the benchmark case.31 Two results are imme-
diate from these diagrams. First, increasing the cross-sectional dispersion of  will shift up the
national income function over the entire range of [kmin; kmax]. This pattern is consistent with the
theoretical predictions in Proposition 5. Second, an increase in time preference heterogeneity will
also shift up the aggregate labour supply function. In a robustness check, we nd the same pattern
under di¤erent values of  within the range of [0; 1] :32 Thus, at least in this regard, the baseline
model considered in these numerical examples is similar to the no-income-e¤ectmodel with a
concave v0 () : The value of k and other aggregate variables under these alternative distributions
are reported in Table 3. Although these results are only suggestive in nature, they do show some
interesting patterns. For instance, increasing the dispersion of time preference tends to have a
31The curves for  = 0:95 are almost indiscernible from those obtained from the baseline case, hence they are
omitted from these diagrams.
32These results are not shown here due to space constraint, but they are reported in the working paper version
available on the authorspersonal website.
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very mild positive e¤ect on k. This suggests that the e¤ect captured by Proposition 5 is slightly
stronger than the one described in Proposition 8. The changes in other aggregate variables then
largely reect the changes in N (k) : In particular, a more dispersed distribution of  is associated
with a higher level of aggregate labour input. These results also point to an important di¤erence
between an exogenous-labour model and a exible-labour model. In the former, an increase in
time preference heterogeneity will have no e¤ect on aggregate labour supply but a signicantly
positive e¤ect on k [due to the upward shift in Y ()]. In the latter, such an increase will only
have a negligible e¤ect on k but a signicant positive e¤ect on aggregate labour supply.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we analyse the long-run economic e¤ects of diversity in a neoclassical model with
ex ante heterogeneous consumers, exible labour supply and progressive taxation. Our results
highlight two important channels through which consumer heterogeneity can a¤ect the steady
state. First, changing either the distribution of labour productivity or time preference will a¤ect
the formation of aggregate labour supply. The exact nature of this e¤ect is determined by the
shape of the individual labour supply function, which is often di¢ cult to determine qualitatively.
Second, changing the distribution of time preference will have an e¤ect on the distribution of
marginal tax rates across individuals. It is shown that the concavity or convexity of the marginal
tax function holds the key in determining these e¤ects. In this analysis, we assume that time
preference and labour productivity are independent of each other. This assumption is adopted
mainly for analytical convenience. As pointed out by Carroll and Young (2009), such a model
may fail to capture the observed patterns of correlation between di¤erent types of income. One
possible direction of future research is to analyse the e¤ects of diversity without imposing the
independence assumption. The model considered here also does not take into account the political
institutions that contribute to the progressive tax system or other redistributive policies. As
discussed in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), these institutions play a crucial role in resolving the
conicting interests within a diverse population, and this will in turn determine the economic
e¤ects of diversity. One exciting and important direction of future research is to introduce some
political elements (such as a voting mechanism) into our baseline model and analyse the e¤ects of
diversity in a politico-economic equilibrium.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Dene   (k)  f (k)   k over the interval [kmin; kmax] : Then the steady-state condition in (13)
can be more succinctly expressed as Y (k) =   (k)N (k) : We will establish some basic properties
of each of these functions, starting with   () : Since f () is strictly increasing and strictly concave,
there exists a unique value kGR > 0 such that  0 (k) ? 0 if and only if k 7 kGR: Since  0 (kmax) =
f 0 (kmax)   =  > 0; we have kmax < kGR which means   () is strictly increasing over [kmin; kmax]
with   (kmin) > 0: Next, we turn to the national income function Y () : Since  () is strictly
increasing, Y () is strictly decreasing on (kmin; kmax) with
Y (kmax) =
Z 



1  


dH1 () > 0;
lim
k!kmin
Y (k) =
Z 



1  

(1  )

dH1 () : (23)
Equation (23) follows from the fact that r (k) approaches = (1  ) as k tends to kmin: Note that
the limiting condition lim
y!1
0 (y) =  implies
lim
!

1  

(1  )

= +1:
Thus, the integral in (23) is potentially divergent. For instance, if H1 () has a positive mass at ;
then Y (kmin) is innitely large and the condition in (16) is automatically satised.
Finally, we will show that the aggregate labour supply function N () is non-decreasing. It
su¢ ce to show that n (k; ; ") is a non-decreasing function in k; for any (; ") : Fix (; ") and
suppose the contrary that 1  n (k2; ; ") > n (k1; ; ") > 0 for some k1 > k2 in [kmin; kmax] :
Since c (k; ) is strictly decreasing in k, we have c (k1; ) < c (k2; ) : By Assumption A2, 	 (c; n)
is non-decreasing in c and strictly increasing in n: Hence, we have
	 [c (k1; ) ; n (k1; ; ")]  	 [c (k2; ) ; n (k1; ; ")]
< 	 [c (k2; ) ; n (k2; ; ")]
 w (k2)
r (k2)
" <
w (k1)
r (k1)
":
The third inequality follows from (10) and the last one uses the facts that w () is strictly increasing
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and r () is strictly decreasing. The above condition implies that n (k1; ; ") = 1 which contradicts
1  n (k2; ; ") > n (k1; ; ") > 0: Hence, n (k; ; ") is a non-decreasing function in k for all possible
values of (; ") :
In sum, we have shown that [Y (k)    (k)N (k)] is strictly decreasing over the interval (kmin; kmax) :
If (15) and (16) are satised, then there exists a unique value k within this range that solves (13).
Conversely, if this equation has a unique interior solution, then the two curves in Figure 1a must
cross once over the interval (kmin; kmax), which implies (15) and (16). This completes the proof of
Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
Fix k 2 [kmin; kmax] and  2

; 

: Suppose the contrary that 1  n (k; ; "2) > n (k; ; "1) > 0 for
some "1 > "2 in ["; "] : Since 	 (c; n) is strictly increasing in n, we have
	 [c (k; ) ; n (k; ; "1)] < 	 [c (k; ) ; n (k; ; "2)]  w (k)
r (k)
"2 <
w (k)
r (k)
"1;
where the second inequality follows from (10). The above condition implies n (k; ; "1) = 1; which
contradicts the hypothesis of 1  n (k; ; "2) > n (k; ; "1) > 0. Hence, n (k; ; ") is a non-decreasing
function in " for all k 2 [kmin; kmax] and for all  2

; 

:
If n (k; ; ") is an interior solution, then it is completely characterised
	 [c (k; ) ; n (k; ; ")] =
w (k)
r (k)
":
By Assumptions A1-A2 and the implicit function theorem, n (k; ; ") is continuously di¤erentiable
in ". Straightforward di¤erentiation then yields
@	
@n
@n (k; ; ")
@"
=
w (k)
r (k)
 > 0:
Since @	=@n > 0; the desired result follows. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
We rst establish an intermediate result.33
33The proof of Lemma A1 has been outlined in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, p.204-205). We include a more
detailed proof here for the sake of clarity and completeness.
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Lemma A1 For any bounded, non-decreasing function g () dened on ["; "] ;
Z "
"
"g (") dH2 (") 
Z "
"
"g (") d eH2 (") ; (24)
if and only if (17) holds.
Proof of Lemma A1 The proof of the only ifpart is obvious. Suppose (24) is valid for all
bounded, non-decreasing functions dened on ["; "] : For any x 2 ["; "], dene the indicator function
I (";x) which equals one if "  x and zero otherwise. Since I (";x) is bounded and non-decreasing,
it follows from (24) that
Z "
"
"I (";x) dH2 (") =
Z "
x
"dH2 (") 
Z "
"
"I (";x) d eH2 (") = Z "
x
"d eH2 (") ;
for any x 2 ["; "] : Next, consider the ifpart. Let g () be an arbitrary bounded, non-decreasing
function dened on ["; "] : Without loss of generality, we can assume g (") = 0: For any positive
integer m  1; partition the interval ["; "] into 2m subintervals of equal length. Specically, dene
a set of end-points fe"i;mg according to
e"i;m = "+ i  1
2m
("  ") ; for i = 1; :::; 2m + 1:
Dene a function m () as follows
m (") =
8><>: g (e"i;m) if " 2 [e"i;m;e"i+1;m) ;g (") if " = ":
This function can be expressed as a linear combination of simple functions, i.e.,
m (") =
m2mX
i=1
i;mI (";e"i;m) ; (25)
where I (";e"i;m) = 1 if "  e"i;m and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cient i;m is given by
i;m =
8><>: g (") for i = 1;g (e"i+1;m)  g (e"i;m) for i = 2; :::; 2m:
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Since g () is non-decreasing and non-negative, we have i;m  0 for all i: Hence, m (")  0 for all
" 2 ["; "] :
By repeating the above procedure, we can construct a sequence of non-negative functions
fm ()g that converges pointwise to g () :We now show that fm ()g is a monotonically increasing
sequence of functions, i.e., m (")  m+1 (") for any " 2 ["; "] : Fix " 2 ["; "] : Then there are
only two possible scenarios: either " < (e"i;m + e"i+1;m) =2 or "  (e"i;m + e"i+1;m) =2 for some i 2
f1; :::; 2mg : In the rst scenario, we have m+1 (") = m (") : In the second scenario,
m+1 (") = m
e"i;m + e"i+1;m
2

 g (e"i;m) = m (") :
Hence, fm ()g is a monotonically increasing sequence of non-negative functions. By the monotone
convergence theorem, we have
lim
m!1
Z "
"
"m (") dH2 (") =
Z "
"
"g (") dH2 (") ; (26)
lim
m!1
Z "
"
"m (") d eH2 (") = Z "
"
"g (") d eH2 (") : (27)
Note that for each m; we have
Z "
"
"m (") dH2 (") =
m2mX
i=1
i;m
Z "
"
"I (";e"i;m) dH2 (") = m2mX
i=1
i;m
Z "
e"i;m "dH2 (") ;
where the rst equality follows from (25). Suppose (17) is true for all x 2 ["; "] : Since i;m  0 for
all i; we have Z "
"
"m (") dH2 (") 
Z "
"
"m (") d eH2 (") :
Equation (24) then follows from (26) and (27). This completes the proof of Lemma A1.
Fix k 2 [kmin; kmax] : By Lemma 2, n (k; ; ") is non-decreasing in " for all  2

; 

: Thus,
after integrating it over the distribution of ; the resulting function
N (k; ") 
Z 

n (k; ; ") dH1 ()
is bounded and non-decreasing in ": Then by Lemma A1,
N (k) 
Z "
"
"N (k; ") dH2 (")  eN (k)  Z "
"
"N (k; ") d eH2 (")
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if and only if (17) holds. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let k and ek be the unique solution of (13) under H2 () and eH2 () ; respectively. As shown in
the proof of Lemma 1, n (k; ; ") is non-decreasing in k for all (; ") : Hence, N () and eN () are
both non-decreasing functions. Suppose the contrary that k < ek: Then we have
Y
ek < Y (k) =   (k)N (k) <  ekN ek   ek eN ek : (28)
The rst inequality uses the fact that Y () is a strictly decreasing function as shown in the proof
of Lemma 1. The second inequality uses the fact that   () and N () are both increasing func-
tions. The last inequality uses the result in Proposition 3. Condition (28), however, contradicts
the hypothesis that Y
ek =  ek eN ek : Hence, it must be the case that k  ek: Since
y (k; ) and c (k; ) are strictly decreasing in k for all  2 ;  ; we have y (k; )  y ek;  and
c (k; )  c
ek;  : Similarly, we have Y (k)  Y ek as Y () is strictly decreasing. Finally,
the implications on aggregate labour input can be seen as follows:
N (k) =
Y (k)
  (k)

Y
ek
 
ek = eN
ek :
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is built upon the following intermediate result:
Lemma A2 Suppose Assumption A3 is satised. Then  () is a convex (or concave) function
if and only if  0 () is concave (or convex).
Proof of Lemma A2 Pick any two positive real numbers y1 and y2; and any  2 (0; 1) : Then
 0 (y1 + (1  ) y2) ?  0 (y1) + (1  )  0 (y2)
,   0 (y1 + (1  ) y2) ?   0 (y1) + (1  )  0 (y2)
, y1 + (1  ) y2 ? 

 0 (y1) + (1  )  0 (y2)

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,   0 (y1)+ (1  )  0 (y2) ?   0 (y1) + (1  )  0 (y2) :
The second line uses the fact that  () is strictly increasing. The third and fourth lines follow
from the identity  [ 0 (y)] = y: Hence,  () is a convex (or concave) function if and only if  0 () is
concave (or convex). This completes the proof of Lemma A2.
Suppose eH1 () is a mean-preserving spread of H1 () and  0 () is convex so that  () is concave.
Then we can write
Y (k) 
Z 



1  
r (k)

dH1 ()  eY (k)  Z 



1  
r (k)

d eH1 () ;
for any k 2 (kmin; kmax) : In other words, changing the distribution of time preference from H1 ()
to eH1 () will shift the Y (k) curve in Figure 1a to the left. Thus, we have ek  k: A similar
argument can be used to establish the results in part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 6
For any q 2 [0; 1] ; dene  (q)  sup f : H1 ()  qg and e (q)  supn : eH1 ()  qo : According
to (3.A.41) and (3.A.42) in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, p.118), eH1 () is a mean-preserving
spread of H1 () if and only if
R 
(q) dH1 ()R 
(q) dH1 ()

R e(q) d eH1 ()R e(q) d eH1 () ; for any q 2 [0; 1] ;
R (q)
 dH1 ()R (q)
 dH1 ()

R e(q)
 d
eH1 ()R e(q)
 d
eH1 () ; for any q 2 [0; 1] :
Since
R 
(q) dH1 () =
R e(q) d eH1 () = 1   q and R (q) dH1 () = R e(q) d eH1 () = q, these conditions
can be more succinctly expressed as
Z 
(q)
dH1 () 
Z 
e(q) d eH1 () ; (29)
Z (q)

dH1 () 
Z e(q)

d eH1 () ; (30)
for all q 2 [0; 1] :
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Using (7) and (29), we can write
Z 
(q)
 0 [y (k; )] dH1 () =
Z 
(q)
dH1 ()  1
r (k)
Z 
(q)
dH1 ()

Z 
e(q) d eH1 ()  1r (k)
Z 
e(q) d eH1 () =
Z 
e(q)  0 [y (k; )] d eH1 () ;
for any k 2 (kmin; kmax) : If the marginal tax function is concave so that ek  k, then we have
Z 
(q)
 0 [y (k; )] dH1 () 
Z 
e(q)  0 [y (k; )] d eH1 ()

Z 
e(q)  0
h
y
ek; i d eH1 () :
The second inequality uses the fact that  0 () is strictly increasing and y (k; ) is strictly decreasing
in k: The results in part (ii) can be similarly obtained by using (7) and (30).
Proof of Lemma 7
Suppose the contrary that n (k; ; ") = 1 for some k 2 [kmin; kmax] and for some (; ") 2

; 
 
["; "] : Then using (22), we can write
w (kmax) " < v
0 (1)  w (k)
r (k)
":
By Assumption A4, w () is strictly increasing and r () is strictly decreasing. Thus, for any
k 2 [kmin; kmax] and (; ") 2

; 
 ["; "] ;
w (k)
r (k)
" <
w (kmax)
r (kmax)
  " = w (kmax) ":
The last equality follows from the fact that r (kmax) = : Note that these two expressions are
contradictory. Hence, we have n (k; ; ") < 1 for all k 2 (kmin; kmax) and for all (; ") 2

; 
["; "] :
This completes the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof of Proposition 8
Fix k 2 [kmin; kmax] and " 2 ["; "] : Suppose v0 (1) > w (kmax) " is satised. Then by Lemma 7, we
have
v0 [n (k; ; ")] =
w (k)
r (k)
";
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for all  2 ;  : Pick any 1 and 2 in ;  and dene  = 1 + (1  ) 2 for any  2 (0; 1) :
Suppose v0 () is concave, then we have
v0 [n (k; ; ")] =
w (k)
r (k)
" = v
0 [n (k; 1; ")] + (1  ) v0 [n (k; 2; ")]
 v0 [n (k; 1; ") + (1  )n (k; 2; ")] :
Since v0 () is strictly increasing, the last inequality implies n (k; ; ") is convex in ; i.e.,
n (k; ; ")  n (k; 1; ") + (1  )n (k; 2; ") :
A partial converse can be obtained by reversing these steps, i.e., if n (k; ; ") is convex in 
over the entire interval

; 

; then v0 (n) is concave between n
 
k; ; "

and n (k; ; ") : This is just
a partial converse because the range between n
 
k; ; "

and n (k; ; ") may not cover the entire
domain of v0 ().
Since convexity is preserved by integration, this means
R "
" "n (k; ; ") dH2 (") is also a convex
function in : Finally, since eH1 () is a mean-preserving spread of H1 () ; we have
N (k) 
Z 

Z "
"
"n (k; ; ") dH2 (")

dH1 () 
Z 

Z "
"
"n (k; ; ") dH2 (")

d eH1 ()  eN (k) ;
for all k 2 [kmin; kmax] : The results in part (ii) can be established by using the same line of
argument. This completes the proof of Proposition 8.
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